ACLED Regional Overview Latin America & the Caribbean: September 2023 – Haiti

Brazil: Surge in fatalities in Bahia amid deadly security operations

In the northeastern state of Bahia, state security operations aimed at curbing gang activity have led to a spike in deadly clashes. In the state capital Salvador, state security operations targeted the Bonde do Maluco (BDM) gang, the Red Command (CV), and other unidentified drug trafficking groups, killing several dozen drug traffickers. The operations came in response to the killing of an officer during a clash with BDM on 15 September, reminiscent of the spate of deadly clashes witnessed in previous months stemming from the killing of an officer in São Paulo in July. The surge in fatalities follows the launch of Operation Shield in August in Bahia and São Paulo states.

Heightened armed group activities in Bahia have been attributed to the CV’s increased presence in the state, which has led to territorial disputes with local groups, including BDM. In 2020, the CV secured an alliance with the local Comando da Paz prison drug trafficking group and capitalized on the disruptions caused by the pandemic to fully immerse themselves in the drug trafficking trade in Bahia.1 The continued escalation in violence and subsequent response has raised questions about the effectiveness of the security policy of the Bahia state administration, ruled by President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Workers’ Party for over a decade.2 Security operations have notably faced increasing scrutiny amid accusations of police abuse and torture, particularly affecting the Black population in Brazil.

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Colombia: Violence targeting candidates surges ahead of regional elections

As voters prepare for regional elections on 29 October, Colombia continues to experience heightened levels of violence targeting political candidates, with at least 15 incidents in September. Since August, ACLED records surging levels of violent incidents targeting candidates, surpassing levels observed prior to the regional elections of 2019. Attacks on candidates in September spanned eight departments and included the fatal shooting of Silvio Rosero Arteaga, a Green Alliance candidate and incumbent head of the Taminango council in Nariño. Other political candidates representing a wide range of political parties were also the targets of failed assassination attempts. Although the perpetrators are often unidentified, the violence has been linked to armed groups seeking to influence the election outcomes in both disputed territories and ones under their control. Rivalries between political actors, however, have also been identified as a potential driver of violence.3 The upcoming elections represent a pivotal moment for President Gustavo Petro, testing the progress made in curbing armed group violence amid ceasefire agreements and peace talks as violence targeting political candidates reaches alarming proportions.

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Haiti: Police and gangs fatally clash as G-9 leader threatens to overthrow the government

Between 14 and 18 September, police forces killed at least 30 gangsters and civilians during operations targeting the Baz Gran Grif de Savien gang in Liancourt, Artibonite. The deadly clashes come amid growing violence perpetrated by Baz Gran Grif de Savien, which controls kidnappings, extortions, and other illegal activities in Liancourt and nearby areas in the Verrettes commune.4 Thus far in 2023, the group’s violent activity, state forces operations, and attempts by self-defense groups to push back the gangs have contributed to more than a three times increase in political violence fatalities in the Artibonite compared to the same period in 2022.

Meanwhile, the G-9 leader Jimmy Chérizier continued to challenge the interim government and on 19 September declared his intention to overthrow President Ariel Henry with armed force.5 The gang leader has previously attempted to destabilize the interim government, notably calling on Haitians to mobilize against the government in August this year and demanding the resignation of Henry in exchange for the end of a G-9-led embargo on the Varreux oil terminal in October 2021. In his statement, Chérizier also indicated his ambition to position himself as a political actor, offering to support the construction of a canal on the Massacre river amid a spat over cross-border water use with the Dominican Republic.6 Days later, he also announced the Viv Ansanm (Live Together) operation alongside allied gangs, calling for an end to violent actions and safety for Haitians.7 The announcement led to tensions within the G-9 alliance, with gangsters killing an allied gang leader known as Tyson for allegedly refusing to cease violent actions.8 It is unclear whether the Viv Ansanm operation will result in any reductions in violence, especially after the United Nations approved the deployment of a foreign security mission — which Chérizier vowed to fight if abuses occur.9

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Jamaica: Gang rivalry-related violence persists in Saint Catherine despite security measures

Political violence increased in September in Saint Catherine parish with more than twice the events recorded in the month prior. Targeted attacks by armed suspects left at least 11 people dead. Most of the attacks were recorded in the southern area of the parish, notably in Spanish Town, where rival factions of the Clansman gang are fighting to control the area.10 In response to gang attacks, police clashed with armed groups, resulting in the killing and arrest of several gang members. The increase in violence comes despite recent government security measures in the parish, including a 14-day state of emergency in June and, more recently, a 48-hour curfew imposed on 11 September to combat insecurity in areas near Spanish Town.11

Since 2019, ACLED records heightened political violence in Saint Catherine, with violence in September 2023 nearly reaching the number of violent events for all of 2022. According to security experts, the arrest of Clansman gang faction leaders in 2018 has contributed to the fragmentation and internal disputes within criminal groups, which in turn has led to heightened fighting over the control of the area.12

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Mexico: CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel rivalry continues with roadblocks and civilian targeting

Throughout September, alleged members of the self-defense group El Maíz — linked to the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) — and members of rival Sinaloa Cartel set competing roadblocks in Frontera Comalapa municipality, Chiapas, and other areas bordering Guatemala. The roadblocks hindered residents’ access to goods and services and exposed them to continued violence and forced recruitment perpetrated by criminal groups.13 In Amatenango de la Frontera municipality, El Maíz kidnapped and killed a school teacher in retaliation for her husband’s refusal to participate in the roadblocks,14 and the CJNG executed four people on the roads leading to Frontera Comalapa.

On 25 September, the federal government deployed around 800 military and National Guard officers to lift the roadblocks and restore security in the region.15 In at least seven municipalities, reportedly controlled by the Sinaloa Cartel, residents barricaded roads to prevent the entrance of the security forces and demanded action against El Maíz and the CJNG in Frontera Comalapa.16 The expansion of the CJNG to control drug and migrant trafficking routes along the border with Guatemala has driven tensions with other armed groups, including with the Sinaloa Cartel — which previously controlled the area and has sought to regain lost territories.17 ACLED records increased violence in Chiapas in 2023, already surpassing levels recorded in 2022.

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Venezuela: Tren de Aragua prison stronghold seized by Venezuelan authorities

On 20 September, 11,000 Venezuelan security forces raided Tocorón prison — the operational hub for the Tren de Aragua gang. Authorities have not reported on any inmate casualties, but four Venezuelan security forces were arrested over possible leaks that enabled the escape of hundreds of gang members ahead of the raid,18 including leader Héctor Guerrero Flores, also known as ‘El Niño Guerrero.’

While deemed a success by the Venezuelan government, which claimed to have dismantled Tren de Aragua, some have denounced that the operation was likely organized in collusion with the gang.19 It remains to be seen if the prison raid will be effective in reducing violence and weakening the criminal structure with the transfer of inmates potentially leading to overcrowding and clashes with rival gangs in other facilities.

The escape of Tren de Aragua leaders also raises concerns that the group could further expand its operations. ACLED records violence perpetrated by the criminal group outside of Venezuela, including in Colombia and Chile. Thus far in 2023, violence perpetrated by Tren de Aragua abroad nearly tripled compared to the same period in 2022. Fearing violence could spill across borders, Ecuador — which is suffering its own gang violence crisis — has put its police force on alert. However, the government denied that Tren de Aragua maintains a presence in the country.20 In Peru, the government moved 400 troops to its border with Ecuador as a security measure.21

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